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Using a comprehensive sample of non-earnings 8-K filings from 1996 to 2011, we 
examine whether firms engage in opportunistic reporting of mandatory and voluntary 
news. We find strong evidence of opportunistic reporting of negative news, especially 
among public firms. Public firms are more likely to delay disclosure of negative news, 
report negative news after trading hours, and report on the last day of the week. We also 
find evidence of opportunistic bundling of news. Our findings support the notion that 
managers engage in strategic disclosure by delaying or obfuscating negative news in order 
to mitigate the potential market reaction. Factors such as the risk of litigation, information 
asymmetry, and corporate governance influence reporting behavior. Further analysis of the 
market reaction to opportunistic disclosure uncovers no evidence of investor inattention or 
under-reaction.  
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The purpose of this study is to examine whether firms engage in opportunistic 
reporting of mandatory and voluntary news that is not directly related to earnings. We 
examine two facets of opportunistic reporting: 1) differential timing in disclosure of 
negative and positive news; and 2) bundling of positive and negative news. We focus on 
the disclosure of Form 8-K (“current report”), which is used to announce major events of 
interest to security holders. Events that would trigger an obligation to file Form 8-K 
include those affecting the registrant’s business and operations, financial information, 
securities and trading markets, accountants and financial statements, or corporate 
governance and management. Concrete examples of reportable items include entry into a 
material agreement or its termination, bankruptcy or receivership, completion of 
acquisition or disposition of assets, results of operations and financial condition, costs 
associated with exit or disposal activities, material impairments, departure of directors or 
certain officers, Regulation FD disclosure, notice of de-listing and change of auditor, to 
name a few.1  
An especially appealing benefit of investigating the 8-K form is that it consists of 
several mandatory items and a voluntary item section, allowing us to examine whether the 
reporting strategy of mandatory and voluntary news differs. We exclude 8-K forms which 
include information on results of operations, i.e. quarterly or annual earnings, from the 
analysis for two main reasons. First, the timing differential for disclosure of positive and 
negative earnings news has been investigated extensively in the literature (Patell and 
Wolfson 1982; Penman 1987; Damodaran 1989; Bagnoli et al. 2005, DellaVigna and 
Pollet 2009; Doyle and Magilke 2009; Michaely et al. 2011; Michaely et al. 2012). In 
contrast, to the best of our knowledge this study is the first to examine reporting strategies 
of other major corporate events that require the filing of Form 8-K. Second, firms are 
required to disclose earnings on a regular basis, so earnings announcements have become 
fairly predictable. Firms tend to announce in advance the exact timing of their earnings 
release, and, moreover, appear to adopt a constant reporting policy with respect to 
preliminary earnings (Doyle and Magilke 2009), which suggests that earnings are not 
                                                        
1 The SEC issued Release No. 34-49424, Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of 
Filing Date in March 2004, which became effective on August 23, 2004. The new rule significantly 
increased the number of events to be reported in the 8-K report, and shortened the time-period required to 
disclose these events to no more than 4 business days after the occurrence of the event. See the Appendix for 
details and a complete list of current and old Form 8-K categories, and see Section II for discussion of the 8-
K form. 
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reported strategically in recent years. For example, many firms report preliminary earnings 
after trading hours regardless of whether earnings include positive or negative news. In 
contrast, 8-K filings that are not related to earnings announcements are largely 
idiosyncratic as they depend on the occurrence of events which necessitate the reporting of 
“current” events that are unscheduled by their nature and, hence, their reporting may be 
more likely subject to opportunistic reporting. Indeed, the data reveals significant within-
firm variation in the reporting timing of non-earnings related 8-K forms, suggesting that 
focusing on non-earnings events provides a more powerful setting for examining 
opportunistic reporting. 
Agency problems and misalignment of incentives suggest that managers may 
disclose or withhold voluntary information they possess (Verrecchia 2001). Potential 
factors affecting managers’ voluntary disclosure decisions identified in the literature 
include capital markets transactions, corporate control contest, stock–based compensation, 
litigation cost, proprietary cost, and talent signaling (Healy and Palepu 2001). A major 
focus has been earnings–related disclosures (preliminary earnings releases, management 
forecasts, and guidance), with several studies examining the supplemental disclosures 
within them (e.g. Chen et al. 2002; Levi 2008). Some findings suggest attempts to 
influence investors’ perceptions, to obscure or highlight aspects of the firm’s performance 
(e.g. Bowen et al. 2005; Schrand and Walther 2000). Prior studies have also examined the 
relationship between the release and timing of positive and negative information and 
managerial incentives by looking for example at litigation (e.g. Skinner 1994, 1997; 
Francis et al. 1994; Field et al. 2005), stock options exercise (Aboodi and Kasnik 1999), or 
share issuance (Lang and Lundholm 2000). The evidence accumulated thus far seems to 
suggest that managers systematically delay disclosing bad news (Kothari et al. 2009) but 
may time or accelerate the disclosure of good news to create circumstances that are 
beneficial to themselves or to the firm. 
Gennotte and Trueman (1996) develop a model which shows that the market’s 
reaction to an earnings announcement depends on the time of day at which the disclosure 
is made. The basic result of their model is that the impact of the disclosure is expected to 
be stronger if it occurs during trading hours rather than after the market has closed. They 
 5
conclude that managers should prefer to disclose negative news after-hours,2 and past 
research provides evidence consistent with their prediction. Firms tend to release negative 
earnings news after trading hours (Patell and Wolfson 1982) or on Fridays (Penman 1987; 
Damodaran 1989; Bagnoli et al. 2005; DellaVigna and Pollet 2009) when investors' 
attention is supposedly low, thereby mitigating the potential negative market reaction 
(DellaVigna and Pollet 2009). However, using more recent data, research shows that most 
firms currently adopt a relatively constant disclosure policy of preliminary earnings, 
regardless of whether earnings provide positive or negative news (Doyle and Magilke 
2009; Michaely et al. 2011) i.e. either after or during trading hours. This finding 
contradicts the opportunism hypothesis because this constant disclosure policy implies that 
firms do not alter the timing of negative earnings news. 
Although the more recent empirical evidence seems to suggest that firms generally 
do not report negative and positive earnings differently, the Gennotte and Trueman (1996) 
model broadly relates to mandatory news and hence can be generalized to other news 
items reported via Form 8-K. Another indication of the Gennotte and Trueman (1996) 
model is that when managers have two pieces of information, one of which is earnings, 
they would prefer to disclose them separately (simultaneously) if the earnings news have 
positive (negative) implications for the firm. Anilowski et al. (2007) and Rogers and Van 
Buskirk (2008) provide empirical evidence that managers bundle together earnings news 
and management forecasts. Rogers and Van Buskirk (2008) also show that firms are more 
likely to issue management forecasts when earnings news are positive. Hence, we also 
examine whether firms engage in opportunistic reporting of 8-K items by bundling 
together mandatory and voluntary items.3  
Using a sample of all non-earnings 8-K reports filed with the SEC from 1996 
through 2011 by public and non-public firms4, and examining separately the disclosure of 
voluntary and mandatory news, we find evidence supporting the existence of opportunistic 
                                                        
2 The reason for the lower market reaction during after trading hours is the increase in noise trading 
and consequently post announcement price is less likely to reflect the information of the informed 
traders. 
3 Although conceivably firms could try to opportunistically bundle mandatory items, given their reporting 
affords less flexibility (see Section 2), we focus on the bundling of mandatory and voluntary items. 
4 We classify SEC registrants as ‘non-public’ if their shares are not traded on a public market (as captured by 
CRSP). Both the Exchange Act and Securities Act require a company to register its securities with the SEC 
if those are held by 500 (and in some situations 300) or more persons and the company’s total assets exceed 
$10 million. Thus, these registrants are not per se “private” companies, but their shares are not traded in a 
public market. 
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reporting behavior.5 In particular, we find that public and non-public firms differ in their 
reporting strategies consistent with the investor inattention notion. Public firms are more 
likely to report after trading hours or after trading hours on the last trading day of the 
week. The differences between public and non-public firms are more pronounced when 
news is negative. Specifically, whereas non-public firms tend to disclose negative news 
during trading hours, public firms are more likely to release negative news after trading 
hours. We obtain similar results when analyzing reporting behavior after trading hours on 
the last trading day of the week; public firms are much more likely to disclose negative 
news after trading hours on the last day of the week. The results are comparable when we 
analyze voluntary and mandatory news separately— public firms are more likely to 
opportunistically report negative voluntary as well as negative mandatory news.  
Interestingly, when we examine reporting lags (the number of days between the 
event and the filing date) we find that public firms generally have a shorter reporting lag. 
In addition, the reporting lag of negative news is higher for both types of firms relative to 
positive news, but the difference is smaller for public firms, indicating that public firms 
tend to disclose negative news faster than non-public firms. These results are consistent 
with the potentially greater litigation risk that public firms face, inducing them to release 
news in a timelier manner, especially when news is negative. 
We also find that incentives such as high litigation risk, information asymmetry, and 
governance affect reporting behavior in general. Firms with a high litigation risk tend to 
report news more promptly, likely to alleviate litigation risk due to untimely disclosure of 
material events (Kasznik and Lev 1995; Skinner 1994, 1997; Baginski et al. 2002), yet are 
more likely to report opportunistically— after trading hours and on the last trading day of 
the week. Information asymmetry is associated with a longer reporting lag (consistent with 
the ability of managers to delay the recognition of bad news) and a lower likelihood of 
after-hours reporting of voluntary news. We also find that better governance is associated 
with a higher likelihood to disclose news (positive and negative) after trading hours, and a 
lower likelihood to report negative news after trading hours on the last day of the week. 
These results are consistent with Michaely et al. (2011) who argue that reporting news 
after trading hours allows investors time to absorb the information and to potentially level 
the playing field amongst investors. 
                                                        
5 We use the term ‘voluntary’ (vs. mandatory) with respect to Form 8-K Item 5 and Item 8.01 “Other Events” 
under the old and new forms, respectively. SEC release 2004 of the new form 8-K clarifies: “Also, because 
Item 8.01, Other Events, is designated for voluntary filings, it does not, by itself, impose a duty to disclose 
for purposes of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5”. We follow prior literature defining any disclosure above the 
mandated minimum as “voluntary” disclosure (Core, 2001). See Section II for additional details. 
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 We further define opportunistic reporting using news bundling as incidences where 
firms report both voluntary and mandatory items with conflicting news types in the same 
8-K report, i.e. positive (negative) voluntary item/s together with negative (positive) 
mandatory item/s. Since firms have discretion regarding whether to disclose voluntary 
news and, importantly, when to report voluntary news, they may choose to strategically 
disclose voluntary items with mandatory news. Specifically, firms may choose to release 
positive voluntary news together with negative mandatory news in order to mitigate the 
negative impact of the latter. Alternatively, firms may choose to release negative voluntary 
news together with positive mandatory news in order to reduce the negative impact of the 
former. Consistent with the results described above, we document that public firms are 
more likely to engage in news bundling than non-public firms. Further, we provide 
evidence that firms that are more likely to engage in opportunistic reporting through the 
timing of negative news disclosure are also more likely to engage in opportunistic 
reporting through news bundling. 
A commonly used explanation for opportunistic reporting is that managers time the 
disclosure of negative news to coincide with periods when investors' attention is 
supposedly low, such as after trading hours or on Fridays, in order to mitigate the negative 
reaction to the news (Doyle and Magilke 2009). However, in an efficient market the news 
should be impounded in price immediately and fully once it is released. If news is 
disclosed after trading hours or on Friday, then the reaction to the news should take place 
on the following trading day (Michaely et al. 2011). Indeed, Michaely et al. (2012) show 
that the lower immediate reaction to Friday earnings announcements documented in the 
literature is attributed to different characteristics of Friday announcing firms (smaller 
firms with low institutional ownership and analysts following), rather than to limited 
attention. Using our sample of 8-K filings, we find no evidence that opportunistic 
disclosure (in particular the reporting of negative news with a longer delay or when 
investors' attention and ability to react is supposedly lower) leads to investor under 
reaction.  
We obtain similar results when we examine the market reaction to news bundling. 
These results together with those described above are seemingly puzzling. On the one 
hand, public firms appear to report negative news opportunistically; on the other, there is 
no apparent benefit (in the form of lower market reaction) to such a reporting strategy. 
Although these results indicate that managers’ strategic reporting does not seem (on 
average) to yield a benefit in terms of lower market–reaction to negative news, these 
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results are consistent with the efficient capital markets hypothesis. A possible explanation 
to this puzzle is that managers do not get feedback on what the effects of the alternative 
approach would be (“the road not taken”) or, in a similar vein, that managers choose to 
interpret evidence which confirms what they already believe (confirmation bias) and, in 
this case, they only observe half the picture.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it answers calls to 
investigate and take advantage of mandatory disclosure regulation (Beyer et al. 2010). 
From a comprehensive sample of 8-K filings, we are able to use the characteristics of the 
forms to test for disclosure strategies along several dimensions of timing (within and 
outside trading hours, mid-week vs. last day of trading) and news bundling by 
incorporation of voluntary elements (‘Other Events’). Prior research on the timing of 
earnings releases found a change in recent years towards a fixed disclosure policy. By 
looking at the entire population of non-earnings filings over the last 25 years, we are able 
to provide definitive evidence of material–events disclosure behavior and strategies. We 
make novel use of non-public firms’ filings in order to address questions relating to 
disclosure and reporting incentives and strategies that are stock-market related. We 
contribute not only to the timing–of–disclosure literature, but also to the much less 
explored phenomena of bundling and combining information. Our findings support the 
notion that managers engage in opportunistic disclosure, attempting to delay and obfuscate 
negative news and mitigate its potential impact on the market. We do not, however, find 
evidence that these opportunistic reporting strategies are successful in generating the 
desired market effect. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the 
institutional details regarding Form 8-K and additional relevant literature. Section III 
describes the data and main variables used and provides descriptive statistics.  
Section IV presents our empirical results and Section V concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review and Form 8-K 
In this section we describe in detail the disclosure requirements of Form 8-K and the 
classification of reportable items as mandatory and voluntary. We also briefly discuss 
research related to the informativeness of the information included in the form. We then 
discuss literature on opportunistic reporting and the incentives for voluntary disclosure. 
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Form 8-K 
In addition to filing quarterly reports on Form 10-Q and annual reports on Form 10-
K, public firms must report on certain material corporate events on a more current basis. 
These are filed with the SEC on Form 8-K (“current report”) and serve to announce major 
events of interest to security holders. Events that would trigger an obligation to file Form 
8-K include those affecting the registrant’s business and operations, financial information, 
securities and trading markets, accountants and financial statements, or corporate 
governance and management.6  
Related literature on mandatory disclosure mostly focuses on 10-K and 10-Q filings 
and examines the timing and timeliness of disclosures, generally in terms of the length of 
time within the permitted window within which companies submit their filings. In an early 
study relating to annual and quarterly filings, Easton and Zmijewski (1993) found that 
most firms filed their reports close to the statutory date, regardless of whether the content 
was positive or negative. Carter and Soo (1999) examined the timeliness of 8-K filings 
and their market reaction, finding that negative events were more likely to be filed close to 
the deadline or even after the deadline. They also observed that the subsequent stock price 
reaction was largely dependent on the timeliness of the filings. 
The importance of Form 8-K filings can be gauged by the fact that between 1996 
and 2011 both public and non-public firms filed close to 800,000 such filings, and prior 
research shows that 8-K filings contain information that has valuation implications. 
Specifically, Livnat and Lerman (2009) conduct a large sample investigation of 8-K filings 
using the S&P Filing Dates Database.7 Their main focus is market reaction to the new 
format of 8-K filings (expanded as of end of year 2004), with an emphasis on the 
implications for the information content of periodic reports (quarterly and annual filings). 
They document that disclosed items are associated with abnormal volume and equity 
return, indicating that events reported on the 8-K form have economic substance. Other 
studies generally investigate individual categories in the filings, such as change of auditor 
announcements (Schwarts and Soo 1996), non-reliance on previously issued financial 
statements (Feldman et al. 2008), Regulation FD (Lont et al. 2011), or director 
resignations and departures (Bar-Hava et al. 2012). These studies tend to focus on 
                                                        
6 See Appendix 1 for a complete list of events reported on current and old Form 8-K. Under the previous 
Form 8-K regime (prior to August 23, 2004) companies were required to report fewer significant corporate 
events and had a longer window to comply. 
7 Their database limitations restrict most of their analysis to filings done after August 2004. 
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timeliness compliance (whether the events are reported within the required reporting 
window) and/or market reaction. Ettredge et al. (2011) examine filing compliance with 
respect to changing external auditors (Item 4) and find that non-compliant firms have 
lower quality corporate governance. 
Form 8-K – “Other Events” 
 Form 8-K includes a unique catch-all category, labeled ‘Other Events’ (Item 8.01 
(5) in the new (old) form). This item is reserved for events which are not mandatory to 
disclose but are considered by the firm to be of importance to security holders. The SEC 
defines ‘Other Events’ as follows:8  
 
Section 8 -- Other Events 
Item 8.01 Other Events "The registrant can use this Item to report events that are not 
specifically called for by Form 8-K, that the registrant considers to be of importance to 
security holders." 
 
This SEC definition indicates that firms have complete discretion with respect to the 
news reported under ‘Other Events.' Reporting is voluntary in nature as there is no official 
requirement to report nor time window within which to file. Further, since Item 8.01 is 
designated for voluntary filings, it does not itself imply a duty to disclose for purposes of 
Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 (SEC release 2004). This therefore suggests that the SEC and 
plaintiffs are effectively prevented from suing firms under anti-fraud statutes for failing to 
disclose information under “Other Events”. Indeed, the small number of existing legal 
cases and articles relating to Item 8.01 or Item 5 support the above conclusion both in 
scope and in content.9 
The implications of this voluntary item are interesting. There is essentially no 
litigation, no case law, and no requirement for the firm to define the voluntary standard or 
provide guidance. It would appear that every public company is entitled to make its own 
judgment call as to what it discloses and when under Items 8.01 or Item 5. Indeed, this 
would explain the variety of announcements made under these items. In broad 
classification terms, untabulated analysis reveals that approximately one quarter of 8.01 
                                                        
8 There are very minor differences in the precise wording of ‘Other Events’ item 5 (old form) and item 8.01 
(new form). 
9 In re Comverse Tech., Inc. and In re Browning-Ferris Indus. Also see law review articles Beal (2009), Abril 
and Olazabal (2010), Harv. L. Rev. Note (1997), Steinberg and Goldman (1987), Stuart and Wilson (2009). 
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category filings relate to shares or debt issuance or repurchase, about half as many relate 
to dividends or interest payments, and the remainder are miscellaneous announcements 
relating to litigation matters, other agreements, appointments and stock dividends or splits, 
to name a few.10 
Factors Affecting Disclosure Decisions 
A long line of research examines how reporting strategies, in particular the timing of 
disclosure of positive and negative news, depend on each firm's incentives. Agency 
problems and misalignment of incentives suggest that managers may disclosure or 
withhold voluntary information they possess (Verrecchia 2001). Potential factors affecting 
a manager's voluntary disclosure decisions include capital markets transactions, corporate 
control contest, stock-based compensation, litigation cost, proprietary cost, and talent 
signaling (Healy and Palepu 2001). Prior research has examined voluntary disclosure in 
the form of management forecasts and guidance (e.g. Baginski et al. 2002), non-financial 
value drivers (e.g. Amir and Lev 1996) and supplemental financial disclosure in 
preliminary earnings releases (e.g. Chen et al. 2002, Levi 2008). Some of the findings 
suggest that managers attempt to influence investors’ perceptions using supplemental 
disclosures to obscure or highlight aspects of the firm’s performance (e.g. Bowen et al. 
2005 on non-GAAP measures; Schrand and Walther 2000 on bench-marking). A related 
branch of literature examines the relationship between the release and timing of positive 
and negative information and managerial incentives. For example, the relationship 
between litigation and disclosure (e.g. Skinner 1994, 1997; Francis et al. 1994; Field et al. 
2005), stock options exercise (Aboodi and Kasnik 1999), or share issuance (Lang and 
Lundholm 2000). The evidence accumulated thus far seems to suggest that managers 
systematically delay disclosing bad news (Kothari et al. 2009) but time or accelerate the 
disclosure of good news to create circumstances that are beneficial to themselves or to the 
firm. 
 
                                                        
10 Much of the information reported under Item 8.01 will likely become reportable in the subsequent 10-
Q/K. However, the decision to disclose the information in an 8-K represents voluntary disclosure. 
Nevertheless, some ‘Other Events’ filings might not constitute voluntary disclosure, for example when there 
may be a duty to correct a prior statement or with respect to material forward-looking information prior to 
trading in their own securities (see Heitzman et al. 2010). Such occurrences are unlikely as these types of 
potentially required disclosures are generally earnings related and have a designated item category (and have 
been excluded from our sample). 
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Disclosure Strategy through Timing of Disclosure 
Past research provides evidence consistent with opportunistic reporting of negative 
earnings and dividend news through timing of the news release (commonly referred to as 
the opportunism hypothesis). Firms tend to release negative earnings news after trading 
hours (Patell and Wolfson 1982) or on Fridays (Penman 1987; Damodaran 1989; Bagnoli 
et al. 2005; DellaVigna and Pollet 2009) when investors' attention is supposedly low, 
thereby mitigating the potential negative market reaction. Consistent with lower investor 
attention on Fridays, DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) document that Friday announcements 
have a 15% lower immediate response and a 70% higher delayed response in comparison 
to non-Friday announcements. The under-reaction to Friday announcements suggests that 
managers who maximize short-term value should prefer to release unfavorable 
announcements on Friday. Using more recent data, Doyle and Magilke (2009) and 
Michaely et al. (2011) find that firms tend to a adopt constant reporting policy of earnings, 
e.g. disclosing earnings news after trading hours or on the same day of the week. This 
finding contradicts the opportunism hypothesis because a constant disclosure policy 
implies that firms do not alter the timing of negative earnings news. Furthermore, focusing 
on a sub sample of firms who do not have a fixed reporting strategy, Doyle and Magilke 
(2009) find no evidence of opportunistic behavior on average. Michaely et al. (2011) also 
do not find support for the opportunism hypothesis. Their findings indicate that firms do 
not tend to release negative news outside of trading hours and that there is no under-
reaction to news released after trading hours. They also predict and find that the timing of 
disclosure is associated with the quality of corporate governance. In a recent study, 
Michaely et al. (2012) show that the lower Friday reaction documented in the literature is 
attributed to the different characteristics of Friday announcing firms (smaller firms with 
low institutional ownership and analysts following), and conclude that limited attention 
does not explain the lower immediate reaction to Friday earnings announcements.  
Taken together, early evidence suggests that firms tend to act opportunistically and 
report negative earnings news when investors' attention is supposedly low (after trading 
hours or on Fridays). Recent evidence, however, suggests that firms use a constant 
reporting policy with respect to earnings announcements, and hence do not disclose 




III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We downloaded and analyzed the entire population of 8-K Forms filed with the SEC 
via EDGAR between the years 1996 and 2011.11 From each filing we identify and capture 
firm and report identifiers and a list of reported items (or categories). The initial sample 
consists of 769,040 8-K reports with firm identifier, filing and event dates, items reported, 
and textual content. Given our focus on non-earnings information, we eliminated all 8-K 
reports that contain earnings announcements (Item 2.02 (7) in the new (old) 8-K Form), or 
financial statements and exhibits (Item 9.01), 356,743 forms in total. In addition, we 
excluded 104,080 8-K reports consisting of Regulation FD disclosures (Item 7.01 under 
the new form; based on textual analysis of the old form).12 The reason for this is that 
Regulation FD addresses selective disclosure made by companies, or, put differently, the 
dissemination of information to the public rather than information about an event that 
affects the firm. The regulation requires filing of 8-K in this regard only if the firm 
selectively disclosed material non-public information to certain individuals or entities. 
While an important and interesting issue in and of itself (see for example Griffin et al. 
2011 and the call for further research in Beyer et al. 2010), if the firm did not selectively 
disclose (intentionally or unintentionally) such information, then there is typically no duty 
to disclose it in an 8-K filing. We also exclude 79 forms with filings of Section 6 (Items 
6.01-6.05 contain specialized disclosure requirement that only apply to asset-backed 
securities). These restrictions reduce the sample to 308,138 8-K Forms. We further remove 
amendments to 8-K (12,470 reports), cases where a firm filed multiple 8-K reports in a 
single day (6,360 reports), and cases where a firm filed 8-K reports on subsequent days 
(4,851). The latter two restrictions were imposed to allow for accurate assessment of 
market reaction to the 8-K. The final sample consists of 284,457 reports. 
We analyzed the textual content of the form and each individual item using the 
textual analysis tool General Inquirer (GI) as a measure of how positive or negative the 
                                                        
11 Though started in 1994, mandatory adoption began only in 1996. For a detailed discussion on the EDGAR 
filing system see the SEC document by Sanders and Das (November 14, 2000). 
12 In the old form there is no separate category for Reg FD disclosure. Starting with the effective date of Reg 
FD (October 23, 2000) and until the new Form 8-K became effective (August 23, 2004 companies typically 
reported Reg FD related matters separately or under Item 5 "Other Events". We identify all such Reg FD 
disclosures in the old forms, by searching for the following key words: “Reg FD", "Regulation FD", "Reg 
Fair Disclosure", "Regulation Fair Disclosure", and reclassify them. 
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content (‘news’) of the form and the item was.13,14 Specifically, we computed form news 
as the difference between the total number of positive and negative financial words and 
scale the difference by the total number of words. 15 We computed voluntary and 
mandatory news similarly. We define Item 5 (8.01) as a voluntary item in the old (new) 
form. Voluntary news is therefore computed as the difference between the number of 
positive and negative financial words in Items 5 or 8.01 scaled by the total number of 
words in the item. Mandatory news is computed as the difference between the number of 
positive and negative financial words in all other items scaled by the total number of 
words in the corresponding items. We define negative news indicators for the entire form, 
voluntary and mandatory news, as 1 if the respective news score was positive and 0 
otherwise. Financial data were obtained from Compustat and CRSP. 
We conduct construct validity tests of our news measures by examining the 
association with equity return around the filing date. Untabulated tests show that the mean 
cumulative abnormal return for the positive (negative) news is positive (negative) and the 
difference in abnormal returns is statistically and economically significant, indicating that 
our measure of news captures accurately the news content of the form and each of the 
voluntary and mandatory items.  
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics related to the content and reporting strategy of 
the 8-K Form. Panel A shows that about 47% of the total 8-K Forms in our sample were 
filed by non-public companies. The proportion of 8-K reports containing a voluntary item 
is more than 80% in the years prior to the change in the 8-K reporting requirements 
(2004), and around 40% following the change. The relatively lower proportion of 
voluntary items in the post-change period is consistent with the increase in mandatory 
items that must be reported following the change to the scope of the 8-K Form. The 
proportion of negative news reports is around 50% throughout the sample period and is 
relatively stable. However, the proportion of negative voluntary (mandatory) news is 
                                                        
13 General Inquirer uses the dictionary approach to analyzing text—  a well-established method dating back 
several decades (see, for example, the Harvard-IV-4 and Lasswell dictionaries used in the General Inquirer: 
www.wjh.harvard.edu/~inquirer). We apply in our analysis the modified dictionaries suggested by Loughran 
and McDonald (2011). 
14 The ability to classify attributes of disclosed content has been previously identified as a potentially 
important contribution (Core 2001) and has been used in the literature for mandatory as well as discretionary 
disclosures (e.g. Feldman et al. 2010 for MD&A, Rogers et al. 2011 for earnings announcements). 
15 Our use of this textual analysis based measure is consistent with the caveats in the literature. In our 
setting, it is used to broadly distinguish between items containing more positive vs. more negative text, 
rather than making any subtle inference with respect to word choice (see for example discussion in Berger 
(2010)).  
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significantly higher (lower) in the period following the change. One potential explanation 
for the difference in the proportion of negative news is the nature of the change to the 
form in 2004. The reporting requirements prior to the change in 2004 included fewer 
mandatory items and most of these items were related to negative events such as 
bankruptcy or receivership (Item 3), change in auditor (Item 4), and resignation of 
directors as the result of disagreement with management (Item 6).  
Panel B presents the mean of variables related to our proxies for disclosure strategy, 
namely reporting lag, after trading hours indicator, last trading day indicator, and after 
trading hours on last trading day of the week indicator. Consistent with the requirement of 
a shorter reporting window between the event and filing dates, the reporting lag is around 
4 (calendar) days on average under the new form and 8 days under the old form. 
Interestingly, the reporting lag is consistently decreasing over the years under the old and 
new forms: from 9.6 days in 1996 to 5.1 days in 2003, and from 4.9 in 2005 to 3.8 in 
2011. This finding is in line with increasing demand for more timely disclosure. The 
proportion of forms reported after trading hours is around 49% for the new forms, and is 
almost uniformly increasing from 0.42 in 2002, to 0.51 in 2011. In contrast, the proportion 
of forms reported on the last trading day of the week is decreasing over the years, from 
0.232 in 1996 to 0.206 in 2011. However, the proportion of 8-K forms filed after trading 
hours on the last trading day of the week increased slightly from 0.09 in 2002 to 0.107 in 
2011.  
Doyle and Magilke (2009) find that firms use constant reporting policy when 
disclosing preliminary earnings (e.g. reporting always after trading hours), suggesting that 
firms do not report earnings opportunistically. To examine whether firms adopt a uniform 
reporting strategy of other events reported in an 8-K, we compute the standard deviation 
of reporting lag, the proportion of forms filed after trading hours, the proportion of forms 
filed on the last trading day of the week, and the proportion of forms filed after trading 
hours on the last trading day of the week at the firm-year level. Panel C presents the 
results. Firms file approximately three reports annually. The mean and median standard 
deviations of the reporting strategy variables are significantly greater than 0, indicating 
that firms do not adopt uniform reporting strategies related to 8-K reports which exclude 
earnings related information. Hence, while firms are less likely to disclose earnings 
strategically, the evidence suggests that they are more likely to engage in opportunistic 
reporting when the 8-K included non-earnings related events. 
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Panel D reports the content distribution of the old and new 8-K reports and the 
market reaction to the various items. Under the old form, 83% of the forms included Item 
5, "Other Events," and 8.8% of the reports included Item 4, "Change in Registrant's 
Certifying Accountant".16 Hence, prior to the change to the 8-K Form, most information 
contained in the report was voluntary in nature. The average abnormal returns in the three 
days, centered on the filing date for both items, are negative and significant ( p-value < 
0.01), and the overall average abnormal return around the filing date (not tabulated) is -
0.25% and significant ( p-value < 0.01). Under the new form, the most commonly reported 
items are Item 8.01, "Other Events," (37%); Item 5.02,  "Departure of Directors or 
Principal Officers, Election of Directors, Appointment of Principal Officers," (27%); and 
Item 1.01, "Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement," (22%). The strongest market 
reaction (-16.5%) is to Item 1.03 "Bankruptcy or Receivership". Other items that elicit 
significant market reaction include entry into material agreement (Item 1.01), events that 
trigger an increase in direct financial obligations (Item 2.04), announcement of material 
impairments (Item 2.06), notice of delisting (Item 3.01), change in certifying accountant 
(Item 4.01), and notice of non-reliance on previously filed financial statements, i.e. 
restatements (Item 4.02). The overall average reaction to the new 8-K form is -0.05% and 
significant ( p-value < 0.01).       
 
IV. Results 
This section reports the results of multivariate tests. We first discuss whether firms 
engage in opportunistic (strategic) disclosure of negative news in general, and whether 
there is any difference between public and non-public firms in the disclosure of negative 
news. We then examine whether such disclosures depend on firm characteristics such as 
information asymmetry, litigation risk, or distance to default. Last, we examine whether 
firms are able to mitigate the reaction to negative news by engaging in opportunistic 
disclosure.  
 
Reporting Strategy through disclosure timing by Public and Non-public Firms 
We test whether firms engage in an opportunistic disclosure strategy by estimating 
the following model:  
 
 
                                                        
16 The proportions are computed relative to the 8-K sample, which again, excludes earnings related 
information.  
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Disclosure Strategy Variable = a0+a1*Number of Items + a2*Dummy(Public) + 
a3*Dummy(Negative News) + a4* Dummy(Public)t*Dummy(Negative News) + Year 
Effects+ ε,          (1) 
 
where the dependent variables are the reporting lag between the event and filing dates, 
after trading hours indicator, last trading day of the week indicator, and after trading hours 
on the last trading day of the week indicator. The independent variables include the 
number of items included in the form, which is a proxy for form complexity; indicator 
variables for public firms and negative news; and interaction variable of the public 
company and negative news indicators. We estimate the regression separately for the pre 
and post changes to Form 8-K in August 2004. In addition, we examine whether firms 
opportunistically report negative voluntary and mandatory items.  
In the above specification, the coefficient a2 captures whether the disclosure 
strategy of public firms differs from non-public firms; a3 captures the difference in 
reporting strategy for negative news; a4 captures whether public firms differ from non-
public firms in reporting negative news. The sum of the coefficients a3 and a4 gives the 
overall coefficient on negative news by public firms. With the exception of the reporting 
lag regression, all regressions are estimated using Logit. The reporting lag regression is 
estimated using Tobit. The standard errors are corrected for firm clustering. 
Table 2, Panel A presents the reporting lag regressions. The positive coefficient on 
the number of items indicates that reporting lag increases with form complexity. With the 
exception of mandatory news under the old form, reporting lag is higher for negative 
news, implying that firms defer the disclosure of negative news in comparison to positive 
news. The negative coefficient on the public company indicator suggests that reporting lag 
for public firms is unconditionally lower than non-public firms, consistent with the greater 
demand for timely information by public firms due to their capital structure. The 
coefficient on the interaction of the public company and negative news indicator variables 
is negative and significant ( p-value < 0.01) for all 8-K Forms and Voluntary News. These 
results imply that public firms release negative news faster than non-public firms. 
However, the F-test at the bottom of the table indicates that the reporting lag of negative 
news by public firms is still greater than positive news, under both the old and new 8-K 
Forms. The table shows similar results when we bifurcate the form to voluntary and 
mandatory news. Interestingly, firms tend to release negative voluntary news with a larger 
delay in comparison to mandatory news. This result is consistent with intuition —  the 
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reporting of voluntary news carries much lower litigation risk and hence allows for greater 
reporting lag. Overall, the results suggest that both public and non-public firms are likely 
to delay the disclosure of negative news, especially voluntary news, consistent with 
opportunistic reporting, and that public firms report both positive and negative news more 
promptly than non-public firms.  
Table 2, Panel B shows the after trading hours regression results. The likelihood of 
after trading hours reporting increases with form complexity, but decreases when the news 
is negative, especially under the new form which includes mandatory news. In other 
words, firms are more likely to report negative news, especially mandatory news, during 
trading hours. The likelihood of reporting 8-K after trading hours, irrespective of 
voluntary or mandatory news, is significantly higher for public firms under the new  
8-K Form. The likelihood of reporting negative news after trading hours is greater for 
public firms than non-public firms. Further, the F-test reported at the bottom of the table 
indicates that that the overall likelihood of reporting negative news, with the exception of 
mandatory news under the old form, is positive and highly significant ( p-value < 0.01) for 
the form as a whole, and for voluntary and mandatory negative news. Taken together, 
these results suggest that the likelihood of after trading hours reporting is higher for public 
firms in general under the new 8-K Form, and even higher when the news is negative. The 
latter result holds for both old and new 8-K Form periods. In contrast, non-public firms 
report negative news during trading hours. Hence, the results are consistent with 
opportunistic reporting by public firms; they are more likely to report after trading hours 
especially if the form contains negative news. Non-public firms, on the other hand, are 
less likely to report after trading hours, and even more so when the new is negative.  
Panel C presents the last trading day of the week regression results. The likelihood 
of reporting on the last trading day of the week increases with form complexity, especially 
under the new form. Whereas public firms are less likely to report on the last day under 
the old form, they are more likely to report on the last day under the new form when 
reporting mandatory items. The likelihood of reporting on the last day of the week is lower 
when mandatory news is negative under the new form. However, the likelihood of last day 
reporting of negative news by public firms relative to non-public firms is generally higher 
under both the old and new 8-K Forms. In addition, the overall likelihood of reporting 
negative news by public firms on the last trading day of the week is positive (for voluntary 
news) under the old (new) form. This suggests that public firms are more likely to release 
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negative news on the last trading day of the week in comparison to non-public firms and 
that public firms tend to report negative news on the last day of the week.  
The evidence in Panel C does not control for the possibility that the news on the last 
trading day of the week is released during trading hours, thereby allowing investors to 
react promptly to the news. Table 2, Panel D shows the regression results where the 
dependent variable is the indicator variable for reporting after trading hours on the last 
trading day of the week (henceforth AHLTD). The regression coefficients under the old 8-
K Form are generally not significant, but indicate that the likelihood of reporting AHLTD 
for public firms is positive and significant ( p-value < 0.1) for the form as a whole and 
when the form contains negative voluntary news. Looking at the new 8-K Form results, 
we observe that the likelihood of AHLTD increases with form complexity, but decreases 
with negative news, particularly when the form contains negative mandatory item/s. In 
other words, negative news is less likely to be reported AHLTD. Comparing public and 
non-public companies, we find that the latter are more likely to report AHLTD in general, 
and especially when news is negative. Further, an F-test suggests that, similar to the old 8-
K results, the likelihood of reporting AHLTD for public firms is positive and highly 
significant ( p-value < 0.01), especially concerning negative voluntary news. Thus, our 
evidence suggests that public firms are more likely to engage in opportunistic reporting as 
compared with non-public firms, especially for negative news.  
In summary, we find that public and non-public firms differ in their reporting 
strategy. Public firms have a shorter reporting lag, are more likely to report after trading 
hours, and after trading hours on the last trading day of the week. The differences between 
public and non-public firms are more pronounced when the news is negative. Specifically, 
public firms release negative news faster than non-public firms. In addition, whereas non-
public firms disclose negative news during trading hours, public firms release negative 
news after trading hours. Similar results are obtained when we analyze reporting behavior 
after trading hours on the last trading day of the week. Overall, the results are consistent 
with the opportunistic disclosure strategy of negative news, particularly by public firms; 
these firms are likely to defer the disclosure of negative news, and more likely to report 




Reporting Strategy and Firm Characteristics 
In this section we examine whether the reporting strategy of public firms is 
associated with firm characteristics. We use control variables that were shown to affect 
reporting strategy. Specifically, we control for litigation risk, information asymmetry and 
financial distress (Kothari et al. 2009), and corporate governance (Michaely et al. 2011).  
Following Francis et al. (2004), we define a high litigation risk indicator as 1 for 
firms with SIC codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674, 5200-5961, 7370-7374, 8731-
8734, and 0 otherwise. Following Kothari et al. (2009), we compute an information 
asymmetry score using factor analysis utilizing the market-to-book ratio, equity return 
volatility, leverage, membership of high-tech industry, and regulatory status. The market-
to-book and leverage ratios (calculated as the sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled 
by total assets) are computed using beginning-of-the-year variables. Equity return 
volatility is the standard deviation of daily stock return in year t-1. We define high tech 
membership as 1 for firms with SIC codes 2833–2836, 3570– 3577, 3600– 3674, 7371– 
7379, 8731– 8734, and 0 otherwise. Regulatory status takes the value of 1 for firms in 
regulated industries: 4812-4813, 4833, 4841, 4811-4899, 4922-4924, 4931, 4941, 6021-
6023, 6035-6036, 6141, 6311, 6321, 6331, and 0 otherwise. We define the High 
Asymmetry Indicator as 1 if the asymmetry factor is greater than the median and 0 
otherwise.17 We measure financial distress using the Zmijewski Z-score (1984), and define 
a Distress Indicator variable as 1 if the beginning of the year Z-score is in the top decile. 
Following Michaely et al. (2011), we use the proportion of institutional ownership by 
institutions holding more than 5% as a proxy for corporate governance.  
We predict that firms with high litigation risk will report negative news more 
promptly to reduce the risk of litigation. Firms with high information asymmetry have a 
greater ability to hide negative news but may also have an incentive to provide full and 
prompt disclosure in order to reduce any market penalties associated with high 
information asymmetry. Consequently, we do not make any predictions related to 
asymmetry. Firms in high financial distress have an incentive to delay bad news relative to 
good news because disclosing bad news promptly may exacerbate the precarious situation 
of the company. Michaely et al. (2011) suggest that firms with better corporate governance 
tend to release earnings outside trading hours, potentially to allow investors time to absorb 
                                                        
17 Similar to Kothari et al. (2009), the asymmetry factor is negatively associated with the book-to-market 




and process the information and to level the playing field amongst them. However, the 
limited–attention argument would suggest that opportunistic behavior (likely correlated 
with weaker governance) is associated with the reporting of negative news after trading 
hours. Hence, we do not make a prediction with respect to the association between 
opportunistic reporting of negative news and the quality of corporate governance. 
Table 3, Panel A presents the reporting lag regressions separately for the periods 
under the old and new 8-K Forms. The coefficients on the negative news indicator are 
positive and significant ( p-value < 0.01) under the old form, for the form in general and 
voluntary news in particular (which constitutes most of the old 8-K Forms). Under the 
new form, the coefficient on negative news is significant for negative voluntary news ( p-
value < 0.05), and positive and significant one–tailed only for negative mandatory news 
and negative form news. Thus, consistent with the finding reported above, firms tend to 
delay the disclosure of negative news. Firms with high litigation risk are likely to release 
Form 8-K more promptly, especially if it contains voluntary news. Interestingly, these 
firms are more likely to defer the recognition of negative voluntary news but to report 
negative mandatory news more promptly. These results are indicative of prompt reporting 
of mandatory negative events and delayed recognition of negative voluntary news, 
consistent with the greater litigation risk associated with the reporting of mandatory items. 
Firms with high information asymmetry report 8-K with a longer reporting lag under both 
forms, but disclose negative news more promptly, especially negative voluntary news 
under the new form. Financially distressed firms are likely to issue 8-K's  more promptly 
under the new form.  
Taken together, we find that firms in general tend to report negative news 
unconditionally with longer reporting lag, and that the reporting lag is negatively 
(positively) associated with litigation risk (information asymmetry). However, when it 
comes to negative news, high litigation risk leads to more prompt reporting of mandatory 
news but delayed reporting of voluntary negative news. Conversely, high asymmetry firms 
report negative news more promptly.  
Table 3, Panel B shows the after-trading-hours regressions. Given the relatively 
smaller number of observations under the old 8-K Form (because time-stamped data is 
available only from 2002 onwards) we focus our discussion on the period under the new 
form. The coefficients on the negative news indicator are positive and significant, 
indicating that firms unconditionally tend to report negative news after trading hours. High 
litigation firms tend to file 8-K Forms after trading hours irrespective of the type of news  
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( p-value < 0.01). Similarly, the positive and significant coefficient on institutional 
ownership ( p-value < 0.1) suggests that firms with better governance tend to release news 
after trading hours. None of the interaction with negative news indicator variables is 
significant. Our results therefore further confirm that all firms are more likely to release 
negative news after trading hours. High litigation firms and firms with high institutional 
ownership tend to release 8-K Forms after trading hours, irrespective of whether the news 
content is positive or negative. 
Panel C presents the last–trading–day–of–the–week regressions. Under the old 8-K 
Form, the coefficients on negative news are positive and significant especially for 
mandatory news, suggesting that firms were more likely to report negative news on the 
last day of the week. Financially distressed firms and firms with high institutional 
ownership were less likely to report negative news on the last day of the week. The results 
under the new form are weaker. There is no evidence to support opportunistic behavior—   
i.e., of reporting negative news on the last trading day of the week. However, when we 
examine reporting after trading hours on the last day of the week, we find evidence of 
opportunistic behavior. Table 3, Panel D shows that firms are more likely to report 
negative news on the last trading day of the week, especially voluntary negative news. 
High litigation firms are also more likely to file 8-K on the last trading day of the week, 
whereas information asymmetry is negatively associated with weekend reporting of 
voluntary news. The coefficient on the interaction of institutional ownership and negative 
news indicator variable is negative and significant ( p-value < 0.1), indicating that firms 
with better governance tend not to release negative news on the last trading day of the 
week, potentially to allow investors to react immediately to the news (during the working 
week). 
Taken together, the results in Table 3 provide additional evidence in support of 
opportunistic behavior. Firms tend to report negative news with a longer reporting lag, 
after trading hours, and after trading hours on the last day of the week. We find that 
incentives, especially high litigation risk, information asymmetry, and governance, affect 
reporting behavior in general, but not the opportunistic reporting of negative news. In 
particular, high litigation risk firms tend to report news more promptly, after trading hours, 
and on the last trading day of the week. Information asymmetry is associated with a longer 
reporting lag and a lower likelihood of after-hours reporting of voluntary news. Better 
governance is positively associated with after-hours reporting and less negative news 
reporting after hours on the last day of the week.  
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Reporting Strategy Through News Bundling 
In the previous sub-sections we discuss reporting strategy through disclosure timing. 
In this section we examine whether firms engage in opportunistic reporting using news 
bundling, and whether the likelihood of news manipulation using bundling increases with 
the likelihood of opportunistic reporting through disclosure timing.  
We define opportunistic reporting using news bundling as incidences where firms 
report both voluntary and mandatory items with conflicting news in the same 8-K report, 
i.e. positive (negative) voluntary item together with negative (positive) mandatory item/s. 
As indicated above, firms have discretion regarding whether to disclose voluntary news, 
and importantly, when to report the voluntary news. This flexibility allows firms to 
strategically disclose voluntary items to mitigate the impact of negative mandatory news. 
Specifically, firms may choose to release positive voluntary news together with negative 
mandatory news in order to mitigate the negative impact of the latter. Alternatively, firms 
may choose to release negative voluntary news together with positive mandatory news in 
order to reduce the negative impact of the former.18  
We examine the association of news manipulation using bundling with reporting 
strategy through disclosure timing. In particular, we predict that firms that engage in 
opportunistic reporting through disclosure timing are also more likely to engage in 
opportunistic reporting using bundling of voluntary and mandatory news with conflicting 
signs. To this end, we construct a firm-year proxy of opportunistic reporting through 
disclosure timing by computing the standard deviation of the after trading hours, last day, 
and after trading-hours on the last day indicator variables of all Form 8-K filed prior to 
year t. A low standard deviation indicates that the firm uses a relatively constant reporting 
policy, e.g. all 8-K forms are filed during or after trading hours, and hence the firm is less 
likely to engage in opportunistic reporting. Conversely, a high standard deviation indicates 
that the firm changes often the timing of its 8-K filings, and therefore is more likely to 
engage in opportunistic reporting. Table 4, Panel A shows descriptive statistics related to 
the standard deviations of that timing variables. The mean and median of the standard 
deviation of after-trading hours are higher in comparison to the standard deviation of last 
day and after trading hours on the last day, potentially indicating that opportunistic 
                                                        
18 An alternative strategy is analogous to "taking a bath" strategy - reporting all negative news together, or 
conversely, bundling together positive voluntary and mandatory news. We choose to focus on the more 
plausible motivation for opportunistic reporting, that is, mitigating the reaction to negative events, and thus 
concentrate on cases where the firms reports both voluntary and mandatory items but with conflicting signs. 
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reporting is more likely facilitated through the during vs. after trading-hours disclosure 
timing.19 
Table 4, Panel B shows the proportion of voluntary and mandatory items by the 
number of items reported on an 8-K form. The table shows that the likelihood of reporting 
voluntary item together with mandatory item increases almost monotonically with the 
number of items reported in the table. These results suggest that firms are more likely to 
report a voluntary item when it has to disclose a number of mandatory items. Panel C 
reports the frequency of 8-K filings, which include both voluntary and mandatory items, 
by positive and negative voluntary and mandatory items. Looking at the left to right 
diagonal, we find that conditional on voluntary and mandatory bundling, 62% (53.5%) of 
the positive (negative) mandatory items are reported together with positive (negative) 
voluntary items. The frequency of positive voluntary news reported together with negative 
mandatory news is 46.5%; the frequency of negative voluntary news with positive 
mandatory news is close to 38%. Hence, the likelihood of consistent voluntary and 
mandatory items is higher than conflicting voluntary and mandatory news. Within the 
conflicting news, the likelihood of positive voluntary with negative mandatory is higher.  
Table 4, Panel D presents the regression results of the proxies for opportunistic 
reporting through news bundling on the proxies for opportunistic reporting through 
disclosure timing. Similar to the analysis in Table 2, we also examine whether public firms 
are more likely to engage in opportunistic reporting using news bundling. The Positive 
Voluntary & Negative Mandatory columns show the results where the dependent variable 
is an indicator with 1 if the 8-K includes positive voluntary news together with negative 
mandatory news. The coefficient on the public company indicator is positive and 
significant ( p-value < 0.01) indicating that public firms are more likely to bundle positive 
voluntary items with negative mandatory items. The coefficients on the proxies for 
opportunistic reporters through disclosure timing are not significant, although the 
coefficient on the standard deviation of after trading-hours is positive and significant one-
tailed ( p-value, two tailed = 0.12). When we restrict the sample to public companies only, 
we find that the coefficient on the standard deviation of after trading hours is positive and 
significant ( p-value < 0.01). The next two columns show the results when the dependent 
variable is an indicator with 1 if the 8-K filing includes negative voluntary news together 
                                                        
19 Note that here we report statistics of the standard deviation of the timing variables of all 8-K forms filed 
prior to year t at the firm level, whereas in Table 1, Panel C we show the corresponding stats at the firm-year 
level. The reason for using all forms up to year t is to increase the sample size based on which the standard 
deviations are computed. 
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with positive mandatory news. The results are similar. The likelihood of such bundling is 
higher for public firms and increases with the variability in during vs. after trading hours 
reporting. We also find marginally positive association with the variability in last trading 
day reporting. The last two columns show the results where the dependent variable takes 
the value of 1 if the 8-K report includes voluntary and mandatory news with conflicting 
sign. The results again show higher likelihood for public firms as well as for firms with 
greater variability in during vs. after trading hours reporting. The coefficients on the 
variability of last day reporting are significant one-tailed only. 
Taken together, the evidence in Table 4 indicates that public firms are more likely to 
report voluntary and mandatory news with conflicting sign in comparison to non-public 
firms. Further, firms that are more likely to engage in opportunistic reporting through 
disclosure timing, especially through variability in during vs. after trading hours 
disclosure, are also more likely to report opportunistically using news bundling, that is, by 
bundling together voluntary and mandatory items with conflicting signs. 
 
Market Reaction to Opportunistic Reporting Through Disclosure Timing  
The previous subsections provide evidence of opportunistic reporting strategies 
whereby public firms tend to report negative news with a longer reporting gap, after 
trading hours, and after trading hours on the last day of the week. A plausible explanation 
for this reporting strategy is that firms seek to mitigate market reaction to negative news. 
In particular, by delaying disclosure of negative news the information becomes less timely 
and hence less value-relevant. Similarly, disclosing negative news after trading hours or on 
the last day of the week may prompt a less negative market reaction because investors’ 
attention is supposedly lower at these times (e.g. Patell and Wolfson 1982; Damodaran  
1989; DellaVigna and Pollet 2009). A challenge to this hypothesis is that markets are 
generally considered to be efficient, and therefore, the reaction to the news would be 
immediate and full regardless of when the news is disclosed. The only difference would be 
the timing of the reaction. That is, if the negative news is disclosed during (after) trading 
hours then investors will react fully to the news on the same (following) day. Hence, in 
this section we examine whether or not investors do in fact under-react to negative news 
disclosed opportunistically. 
However, simply examining the association between market returns and strategic 
news reporting is likely to indicate that market reaction to news disclosed strategically is 
more negative, simply because firms tend to report negative news strategically. In other 
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words, since firms tend to report negative news with a longer gap or after trading hours, 
market reaction is likely to be more negative the longer the reporting lag is and for news 
reported after trading hours. To address this issue we take advantage of the richness of the 
8-K Form and restrict the sample to forms with a priori negative news. We then examine 
whether investors under-react to negative news disclosed strategically. In particular, we 
restrict the sample to 8-K reports which include the following items under the old form: 
Item 3 "Bankruptcy or Receivership"; Item 4 "Changes in Registrant's Certifying 
Accountant"; Item 6 "Resignation of the Registrant's Directors", and to the following 
items under the new form: Item 1.02 "Termination of a Material Definitive Agreement"; 
Item 1.03 "Bankruptcy or Receivership"; Item 2.04 "Triggering Events That Accelerate or 
Increase a Direct Financial Obligation or an Obligation under an Off-Balance Sheet 
Arrangement"; Item 3.01 "Notice of Delisting or Failure to Satisfy a Continued Listing 
Rule or Standard; Transfer of Listing"; Item 4.01 "Changes in Registrant’s Certifying 
Accountant"; Item 4.02 "Non-Reliance on Previously Issued Financial Statements or a 
Related Audit Report or Completed Interim Review".   
Table 5, Panel A shows descriptive statistics related to the selected negative items. 
The Abnormal Return column shows the mean abnormal returns for each item. We 
calculate abnormal returns on the date of filing if the 8-K is filed during trading hours and 
on the following trading day if the form is filed after trading hours. With the exception of 
Item 6 and Item 1.02, abnormal returns are negative and highly significant as expected. 
The average reporting lag for the items exhibits variability. Interestingly, although the 
allowed reporting lag under the old (new) 8-K is 5 to 14 (4) business days, the reporting 
lag of the indicated items under the old form is shorter than the reporting lag under the 
new form. The Proportion Afterhours, Proportion Last Day, and Proportion Afterhours on 
Last Day show the proportion of forms filed after trading hours, on the last trading day of 
the week, and after trading hours on the last day of the week, respectively. The columns 
show that with the exception of Item 1.03, there is variation among the disclosure strategy 
variables across the various items. None of the forms in our sample with Item 1.03 was 
filed after trading hours on the last trading day of the week. The variation in reporting 
timing among the variables allows us to examine whether indeed firms are able to mitigate 
the expected negative market reaction through opportunistic reporting of negative news. 
Table 5, Panel B shows the mean difference in returns for each reporting strategy. 
The Afterhours column shows the difference in returns between forms that were filed after 
trading hours and all other forms. The overall difference is negative for both the old and 
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new forms but not statistically significant. The difference in returns for Item 6, 2.04 and 
3.01 is negative and significant ( p-value < 0.1), implying a more negative market reaction 
to after-hours filing. In contrast, the difference in returns for Item 4.02 is positive (i.e. less 
negative reaction to after trading hours filing) and significant ( p-value < 0.05). The Last 
Day column shows the difference in returns between forms that were filed on the last 
trading day of the week and all other forms. Market reaction to Items 2.04 and 4.02 filed 
on the last day is less negative ( p-value < 0.1), but more negative to Item 6 ( p-value < 
0.1). None of the differences for the other items is significant, nor the overall difference. 
The Afterhours on Last Day column shows the difference in returns between forms that 
were filed after hours on the last trading day of the week and all other forms. None of the 
differences is statistically significant. Overall, the univariate analysis provides mixed 
results when analyzing the difference in returns for each item separately. When testing the 
overall difference in returns from the various reporting strategies, we find no evidence that 
investors under-react to the negative news. 
Table 5, Panel C presents the regression results of abnormal returns on the proxies 
for opportunistic reporting. To allow for the possibility that the news leaked prior to the 
actual filing of the form, we supplement the analysis with cumulative abnormal returns in 
the three days centered on the filing date. Among the independent variables we include the 
news score to allow for differences in news within the same items.20 Under the old form, 
the coefficients on last trading day and after trading hours on the last trading day of the 
week indicators are negative and significant for both the one-day and three-day abnormal 
returns. This suggests that forms submitted on the last day or after trading hours on the last 
day elicit more negative returns. Conversely, the coefficient on the reporting lag is positive 
and significant ( p-value < 0.1) when the dependent variable is the 3-day CAR, implying 
that delaying the disclosure of negative news results in a less negative market reaction. 
Under the new form, none of the coefficients is significant with the exception of the 
coefficient on reporting lag, which is negative and significant ( p-value < 0.1) in the 3-day 
CAR regression, indicating that delaying disclosure of negative news results in a more 
negative market reaction.  
In summary, we find no evidence that opportunistic disclosure (in particular the 
reporting of negative news with a longer delay or when investors' attention and ability to 
                                                        
20 Although the sample includes cases that are a-priori material and negative, the extent of negativeness can 
differ among these items. For example, termination of material agreement (Item 1.02) can have different 




react are supposedly lower) leads to under-reaction. Indeed, our analysis of the period 
under the old 8-K Form reveals that prior to the change, opportunistic reporting actually 
resulted in a more negative market reaction. These results together with the analyses in 
previous sections are puzzling. On the one hand, public firms appear to report negative 
news opportunistically; on the other, there is no apparent benefit (in the form of lower 
market reaction) to such a reporting strategy. A possible explanation for finding a more 
negative reaction to opportunistic end-of-week and after-hours filings (under the old form) 
is that firms choose to report the most negative events in these scenarios but our measure 
of news has been unable to capture this. 
 
Market Reaction to Opportunistically Reporting Through News Bundling  
Similar to the analysis above, this sub section discusses whether opportunistic 
reporting of positive and negative voluntary and mandatory news provides any benefit in 
terms of market reaction. In particular, we examine whether reporting positive voluntary 
news together with negative mandatory news (henceforth Type 1 bundling) results in 
higher market reaction in comparison to reporting negative mandatory news only. That is, 
whether reporting positive voluntary news together with negative mandatory news 
mitigates the negative market reaction to the negative mandatory news. Similarly, we also 
test whether reporting negative voluntary news together with positive mandatory news 
(henceforth Type 2 bundling) results in higher market reaction in comparison to reporting 
negative voluntary news only.  
We analyze market reaction to news bundling using matching analysis. Specifically, 
we restrict the Type 1 bundling group to all cases where the report includes one voluntary 
item and one mandatory item, again with positive and negative news, respectively, and 
abnormal returns around the filing date is available. This restriction results in a sample of 
882 Form 8-Ks. We then match the Type 1 bundling cases based on the mandatory item 
with the sample of 8-K forms containing the same mandatory item. We further require that 
the matching pair would have identical disclosure timing (i.e. reporting lag, during/after 
trading hours, last day, and after trading hours on last trading day). If there is more than 
one potential matching candidate, we choose the one with the closest news score. The 
resulting sample consists of 833 pairs, with identical disclosure timing and mandatory 
item. The only difference within each pair is the positive voluntary item included in the 
news bundling group. We repeat the same procedure for the Type 2 bundling, matching 
based on the negative voluntary item. The resulting sample consists of 758 pairs of 8-K 
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reports, which differ only in the existence of positive mandatory item in the news bundling 
group. 
Table 6 shows the regression results. Similar to Table 5, Panel C, we use as 
dependent variable the abnormal return on the filing date or on the following day if the 8-
K is filed after trading hours, and the 3-day cumulative abnormal return centered on the 
filing date. The first two columns show the regressions using the Type 1 bundling matched 
sample. The News Bundling Indicator takes the value of 1 if the 8-K report includes a 
positive voluntary item, and zero otherwise. To address issues arising out of imperfection 
in the matching process, we use the matched variables as control variables in our 
regressions to soak up the effect of the matched pair differences, and also include an 
indicator variable for each pair (Cram et al. 2009). The regressions are estimated using 
OLS and the standard error correct for firm clustering. The coefficient on the main 
variable of interest, the News Bundling Indicator, is not statistically significant, indicating 
that reporting positive voluntary news together with negative mandatory news does not 
mitigate the negative reaction to the mandatory news. We find similar results for the Type 
2 bundling matched sample. Specifically, the coefficient on the News Bundling Indicator 
is not significant, indicating that reporting negative a voluntary item together with a 
positive mandatory item does not result in higher market reaction relative to reporting a 
negative voluntary item alone. In sensitivity analysis we match the Type 2 bundling cases 
based on the positive mandatory item. Hence the matched samples differ only in the 
existence of the negative voluntary item in the Type 2 bundling group. The results are 
virtually identical— the coefficient on the News Bundling Indicator is not significant.  
Taken together the results indicate that firms potentially engage in opportunistic 
reporting using news bundling, but the evidence suggest that there is no benefit in terms of 
market reaction to such reporting strategy. One possible explanation for the lack of 
findings is that we treat all voluntary items in the same way, yet the voluntary category 
can include economically different news that one cannot control for in such large sample 
setting (see Section II).   
 
V. Summary 
This study investigates reporting strategies of corporate events using Form 8-K 
filings. We test whether firms engage in opportunistic disclosure of mandatory and 
voluntary information. Going beyond the ubiquitous earnings announcements, we 
investigate multiple dimensions of material events disclosures to determine whether firms 
 30
are opportunistic in their disclosure timing of negative vs. positive news, or in bundling 
different news items. Utilizing a comprehensive set of filings over the last 25 years, 
including information on non-public firms, we provide evidence relevant to the debate 
regarding limited attention and the 'Friday effect', the effect of management incentives 
with respect to stock market investors, trading days and trading hours, and the bundling of 
positive and negative news. 
We find evidence of opportunistic reporting behavior, especially in the case of 
public firms reporting negative news. We find that firms attempt to delay and obfuscate 
the disclosure of negative news in order to mitigate its potential market impact. Firms’ 
methods of achieving their reporting goals include delaying negative news disclosure, 
releasing it on the last trading day of the week, disclosing after-hours, and bundling the 
news with mitigating information. We also find that reporting behavior is affected by 
incentives, especially high litigation risk, information asymmetry, and governance. With 
respect to the 'Friday effect' and limited attention notion, using our sample of 8-K filings 
we find no evidence that these opportunistic disclosure methods, either via timing or via 
bundling, lead to investor under-reaction. 
The combination of these results is interesting; while managers are clearly engaged 
in opportunistic behavior, there is no evidence of it bearing fruit. A possible explanation 
may be related to the absence of feedback on the effects of an alternative reporting 
approach or confirmation bias with respect to what managers observe. 
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Appendix I: 
Form 8-K Items Number and Description 




Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement 1.01  
Termination of a Material Definitive Agreement 1.02  
Bankruptcy or Receivership 1.03 3 
Mine Safety - Reporting of Shutdowns and Patterns of Violations 1.04  
Completion of Acquisition or Disposition of Assets 2.01 2 
Results of Operations and Financial Condition 2.02  
Creation of a Direct Financial Obligation or an Obligation under an Off-
Balance Sheet Arrangement of a Registrant 
2.03  
Triggering Events That Accelerate or Increase a Direct Financial Obligation or 
an Obligation under an Off-Balance Sheet Arrangement 
2.04  
Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities 2.05  
Material Impairments 2.06  
Notice of Delisting or Failure to Satisfy a Continued Listing Rule or Standard; 
Transfer of Listing 
3.01  
Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities 3.02  
Material Modification to Rights of Security Holders 3.03  
Changes in Registrant's Certifying Accountant 4.01 4 
Non-Reliance on Previously Issued Financial Statements or a Related Audit 
Report or Completed Interim Review 
4.02  
Changes in Control of Registrant 5.01 1 
Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment 
of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers 
5.02 6 
Amendments to Articles of Incorporation or Bylaws; Change in Fiscal Year 5.03 8 
Temporary Suspension of Trading Under Registrant's Employee Benefit Plans 5.04  
Amendment to Registrant's Code of Ethics, or Waiver of a Provision of the 
Code of Ethics 
5.05  
Change in Shell Company Status 5.06  
Submission of Matters to a Vote of Security Holders 5.07  
Shareholder Director Nominations 5.08  
Asset-Backed Securities  6.01-
6.05 
 
Regulation FD Disclosure 7.01  
Other Events 8.01 5 
Financial Statements and Exhibits 9.01 7 
  
*New form became effective August 23, 2004. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A:  Form Characteristics 
  







1996 2,658 2,973 0.852 0.49 0.445 0.709 
1997 4,426 4,267 0.807 0.49 0.448 0.645 
1998 4,648 4,924 0.85 0.488 0.451 0.666 
1999 4,708 4,835 0.85 0.483 0.431 0.735 
2000 5,314 4,884 0.835 0.486 0.429 0.743 
2001 6,365 5,323 0.849 0.519 0.465 0.779 
2002 6,318 6,640 0.807 0.541 0.472 0.795 
2003 6,230 5,881 0.851 0.504 0.456 0.749 
2004 10,387 10,012 0.584 0.513 0.48 0.552 
2005 18,100 19,799 0.405 0.494 0.52 0.469 
2006 10,926 12,529 0.347 0.499 0.497 0.491 
2007 12,459 16,380 0.353 0.511 0.483 0.515 
2008 10,677 14,650 0.349 0.523 0.504 0.519 
2009 10,047 13,925 0.357 0.538 0.527 0.531 
2010 9,544 12,565 0.38 0.525 0.499 0.528 
2011 9,783 12,280 0.379 0.53 0.506 0.532 
Total 132,590 151,867 
Average 1996-2003 
Average 2005-2011 
0.838 0.500 0.450 0.728 
0.394 0.517 0.502 0.517 
 
Panel B: Disclosure Strategy 
  
Reporting 
Lag Afterhours Last_Day 
Afterhours 
on Last_Day 
1996 9.633 0.232 
1997 9.1 0.224 
1998 8.167 0.235 
1999 8.054 0.231 
2000 7.767 0.227 
2001 7.258 0.23 
2002 6.322 0.42 0.231 0.091 
2003 5.145 0.426 0.223 0.085 
2004 5.058 0.443 0.218 0.094 
2005 4.902 0.472 0.214 0.100 
2006 4.831 0.484 0.218 0.103 
2007 4.308 0.483 0.219 0.106 
2008 4.19 0.494 0.211 0.105 
2009 3.978 0.502 0.216 0.112 
2010 3.916 0.499 0.206 0.104 
2011 3.784 0.509 0.206 0.107 
Average 1996-2003 7.681 0.423 0.229 0.088 





Panel C: Disclosure Strategy at the Firm-Year Level 
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Number of 8-K 2.961 1 2 4 
SD_Reporting Lag 4.468 1.155 2.168 3.536 
SD_Afterhours  0.379 0 0.5 0.577 
SD_Last Day 0.305 0 0.408 0.548 
SD_Afterhours on Last Day 0.17 0 0 0.408 
     
  
Panel D: Reported Items 
  
Item Proportion Sum Abnormal Return (%) 
1 0.027 2,416 0.300 
2 0.05 4,401 -0.170 
3 0.021 1,881 -0.550 
Old 8-K 4 0.088 7,841 -0.500*** 
5 0.83 73,696 -0.240*** 
6 0.012 1,099 -0.280 
  8 0.015 1,374 -0.110 
          
1.01 0.227 44,434 0.310*** 
1.02 0.021 4,056 -0.270 
1.03 0.003 547 -16.500*** 
2.01 0.019 3,722 0.050 
2.03 0.059 11,637 0.030 
2.04 0.005 1,060 -2.030*** 
2.05 0.008 1,617 -0.110 
2.06 0.004 761 -1.530*** 
New 8-K  3.01 0.023 4,585 -2.410*** 
3.02 0.045 8,822 -0.230 
3.03 0.009 1,665 0.620 
4.01 0.026 5,017 -0.450*** 
4.02 0.01 1,980 -1.320*** 
5.01 0.007 1,452 -0.840 
5.02 0.271 52,985 -0.060 
5.03 0.039 7,550 -0.150 
5.04 0.002 398 0.130 
5.05 0.003 513 -0.190 
  8.01 0.373 72,945 0.000 
 
Panel A shows the number of 8-K forms filed by public and non-public companies, the proportion of forms 
reporting voluntary items (Voluntary Items), the proportion of forms with negative news (Negative Form 
News), proportion of forms with negative voluntary news (Negative Voluntary) and negative mandatory 
news (Negative Voluntary). Panel B shows the average number of days between the event date and 8-K 
filing date (Reporting Lag), the proportion of 8-K forms filed after trading hours (Afterhours), the proportion 
of 8-K reports filed on the last trading day of the week (Last_Day), and the proportion of forms reported 
after trading hours on the last trading day of the week (Afterhours on Last_Day). Panel C presents statistics 
on the number of 8-K reports and the mean and standard deviation of Reporting Lag, Afterhours, Last_Day 
and Afterhours on Last_Day at the firm-year level. Panel D reports the proportion of items reported in the 8-
K, the total number of 8-K containing the specific item, and the 3 days cumulative abnormal returns centered 
on the filing date. Abnormal Returns are computed based on Fama-French (1992) three factor model. ***, **, 
and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 2: Unconditional Analysis of Reporting Strategy 
 
 























 Old 8-K (1996-2004) New 8-K (2004-2011) 








Constant 4.443*** 3.919*** 10.043*** 1.272*** -3.367*** 3.903*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Items 4.952*** 5.233*** 2.490*** 1.087*** 2.364*** 0.322*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Negative News Indicator 1.336*** 0.738* -0.542 1.017*** 2.133*** 0.311** 
 (0.000) (0.092) (0.273) (0.000) (0.000) (0.045) 
Public Company Indicator -5.334*** -5.009*** -4.802*** -2.170*** -2.938*** -1.975*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Company Indicator*Negative News 
Indicator 
-0.183 0.036 -0.226 -0.847*** -1.207*** -0.254 
(0.671) (0.944) (0.784) (0.000) (0.000) (0.126) 
       
Observations 88,840 73,938 16,549 195,617 73,036 131,597 
Public Firms Negative News 1.154*** 0.773*** -0.768 0.170*** 0.926*** 0.0572*** 
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 Old 8-K (1996-2004) New 8-K (2004-2011)








Constant -0.441*** -0.458*** -0.301** -0.364*** -0.580*** -0.197*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Items 0.165** 0.149* 0.138* 0.213*** 0.268*** 0.152*** 
 (0.021) (0.067) (0.063) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Negative News Indicator -0.008 -0.032 0.033 -0.092** -0.017 -0.122** 
 (0.841) (0.498) (0.670) (0.030) (0.601) (0.047) 
Public Company Indicator -0.033 -0.036 0.028 0.260*** 0.172*** 0.304*** 
 (0.463) (0.439) (0.813) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Company Indicator*Negative News 
Indicator 
0.166*** 0.177*** 0.137 0.201*** 0.224*** 0.195*** 
(0.004) (0.007) (0.306) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
       
Observations 28,961 23,710 5,670 195,617 73,036 131,597 
Public Firms Negative News 0.157*** 0.144*** 0.170 0.109*** 0.207*** 0.0722*** 
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 Old 8-K (1996-2004) New 8-K (2004-2011)








Constant -1.219*** -1.222*** -1.278*** -1.384*** -1.437*** -1.348*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Items 0.049 0.079* -0.006 0.031** 0.056*** 0.022 
 (0.230) (0.087) (0.896) (0.013) (0.001) (0.102) 
Negative News Indicator -0.006 -0.037 0.015 -0.079** 0.009 -0.130*** 
 (0.797) (0.186) (0.773) (0.023) (0.772) (0.007) 
Public Company Indicator -0.076*** -0.080*** 0.054 0.027 -0.050 0.057*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.459) (0.131) (0.102) (0.005) 
Public Company Indicator*Negative News 
Indicator 
0.067* 0.079** -0.016 0.085** 0.057 0.108** 
(0.052) (0.040) (0.850) (0.025) (0.165) (0.034) 
       
Observations 88,840 73,938 16,549 195,617 73,036 131,597 
Public Firms Negative News 0.0608*** 0.0424 -0.00186 0.00604 0.0660*** -0.0215 
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Table 2 shows the regression results of the disclosure strategy variables on form characteristics and type of company. P values are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in 
Panel A, B, C, and D is the reporting lag between the filing and event days, after trading hours indicator, last trading day of the week indicator, and after trading hours on the last day 
of the week indicator, respectively. After trading hours takes the values of 1 if the 8-K report is filed outside trading hours (9AM to 4PM) and zero otherwise; last trading day of the 
week indicator takes the value of 1 if the 8-K report is filed on the last trading day of the week and zero otherwise; after trading hours on the last day of the week indicator takes the 
value of 1 if the 8-K report is filed after trading hours on the last trading day of the week. Number of Items is number of Items reported in the form. Negative News Indicator takes 
the value of 1 if the news are negative and zero otherwise. Public Company Indicator takes the value of 1 if the company shares are traded. Public Firms Negative News is the sum 
of the coefficients on Public Company Indicator and the interaction variable Public Company Indicator*Negative News Indicator. With the exception of the reporting lag regression, 
the regressions are computed using Logit. The reporting lag regression is computed using Tobit. All regressions include year fixed effect. The standard errors correct for firm 







 Old 8-K (1996-2004) New 8-K (2004-2011)








Constant -2.438*** -2.349*** -2.291*** -2.344*** -2.515*** -2.229*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Items 0.171 0.062 0.112 0.107*** 0.158*** 0.070*** 
 (0.103) (0.637) (0.315) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Negative News Indicator 0.023 0.007 -0.013 -0.069* 0.001 -0.108** 
 (0.698) (0.915) (0.918) (0.089) (0.977) (0.046) 
Public Company Indicator -0.006 -0.017 0.216 0.153*** 0.014 0.206*** 
 (0.918) (0.800) (0.232) (0.000) (0.763) (0.000) 
Public Company Indicator*Negative News 
Indicator 
0.090 0.114 -0.104 0.152*** 0.226*** 0.135** 
(0.280) (0.226) (0.619) (0.001) (0.000) (0.021) 
       
Observations 28,961 23,710 5,670 195,617 73,036 131,597 
Public Firms Negative News 0.113* 0.121* -0.117 0.0832*** 0.227*** 0.0269 
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Table 3: Reporting Strategy and Firm Characteristics 
 
Panel A: Reporting Lag 
 
 Old 8-K (1996-2004) New 8-K (2004-2011)
 Overall Voluntary 
News 
Mandatory News Overall Voluntary 
News 
Mandatory News 
Constant -0.510 -1.618 6.443*** 0.219 -4.801*** 2.772*** 
 (0.622) (0.138) (0.001) (0.164) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Items 4.793*** 5.483*** 1.620* 0.783*** 2.301*** -0.044 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.083) (0.000) (0.000) (0.311) 
Negative News Indicator 1.496*** 1.369*** -1.158 0.190 0.624** 0.164 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.262) (0.153) (0.025) (0.171) 
High Litigation Indicator -0.183 -0.082 0.412 -0.304* -0.697** -0.110 
 (0.742) (0.887) (0.774) (0.095) (0.037) (0.491) 
High Litigation Indicator* 
Negative News Indicator 
-0.997 -1.401* 0.766 -0.133 0.862** -0.503***
(0.127) (0.053) (0.617) (0.521) (0.043) (0.008) 
Asymmetry 1.639*** 1.471*** 1.528 0.859*** 0.734** 0.609*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.245) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) 
Asymmetry*Negative News 
Indicator 
0.612 0.865 -1.324 -0.352* -1.113*** 0.116 
(0.259) (0.143) (0.350) (0.078) (0.007) (0.498) 
Distress Indicator 0.478 0.406 -0.016 -0.378** -0.374 -0.151
 (0.386) (0.482) (0.991) (0.018) (0.276) (0.271) 
Distress Indicator*Negative News 
Indicator 
-0.344 -0.242 -0.834 0.152 0.349 0.103 
(0.649) (0.779) (0.594) (0.474) (0.449) (0.596) 
Institutional Ownership -0.953 -0.469 -1.021 0.561 -0.125 0.430 
 (0.462) (0.729) (0.766) (0.105) (0.845) (0.151) 
Institutional Ownership*Negative 
News Indicator 
-0.073 -0.501 1.752 -0.474 -0.398 0.029 
(0.967) (0.803) (0.657) (0.244) (0.638) (0.937) 
       
Observations 30,738 27,273 3,682 85,775 30,748 59,154 
  
 43
Panel B: After Trading Hours 
 
 Old 8-K (1996-2004) New 8-K (2004-2011)
 Overall Voluntary 
News 
Mandatory News Overall Voluntary 
News 
Mandatory News 
Constant -0.945*** -1.231*** -0.734** -0.065 -0.554*** 0.241*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.124) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Items 0.566*** 0.806*** 0.448** 0.159*** 0.276*** 0.076*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) (0.046) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Negative News Indicator 0.113 0.037 0.480** 0.132*** 0.262*** 0.081** 
 (0.133) (0.657) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) 
High Litigation Indicator 0.060 0.055 0.325 0.200*** 0.244*** 0.176*** 
 (0.571) (0.619) (0.365) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
High Litigation Indicator* 
Negative News Indicator 
0.129 0.241 -0.540 -0.054 -0.144 0.015 
(0.390) (0.147) (0.193) (0.311) (0.149) (0.791) 
Asymmetry -0.044 -0.052 -0.148 0.012 -0.132* 0.052 
 (0.625) (0.578) (0.625) (0.791) (0.064) (0.261)
Asymmetry*Negative News 
Indicator 
-0.050 -0.140 0.425 0.014 0.107 -0.024 
(0.682) (0.295) (0.221) (0.772) (0.205) (0.645) 
Distress Indicator 0.212 0.163 0.813** -0.043 -0.089 -0.008 
 (0.168) (0.327) (0.015) (0.374) (0.288) (0.873) 
Distress Indicator*Negative News 
Indicator 
-0.038 0.163 -1.012** -0.050 -0.024 -0.037 
(0.840) (0.441) (0.013) (0.381) (0.820) (0.555)
Institutional Ownership 0.227 0.307 -0.432 0.161* 0.184 0.131 
 (0.416) (0.288) (0.594) (0.083) (0.198) (0.181) 
Institutional Ownership*Negative 
News Indicator 
-0.149 -0.184 0.512 -0.159 -0.145 -0.149 
(0.667) (0.625) (0.574) (0.109) (0.433) (0.162) 
       





Panel C: Last Trading Day of the Week 
 
 Old 8-K (1996-2004) New 8-K (2004-2011)
 Overall Voluntary 
News 
Mandatory News Overall Voluntary 
News 
Mandatory News 
Constant -1.263*** -1.321*** -1.080*** -1.347*** -1.520*** -1.267*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Items 0.020 0.064 -0.113 0.008 0.085*** -0.019 
 (0.877) (0.667) (0.399) (0.657) (0.001) (0.296) 
Negative News Indicator 0.096** 0.061 0.205* -0.023 0.018 -0.051 
 (0.030) (0.210) (0.099) (0.535) (0.807) (0.171) 
High Litigation Indicator -0.048 -0.070 0.276 -0.017 -0.048 -0.019 
 (0.448) (0.286) (0.188) (0.652) (0.478) (0.666) 
High Litigation Indicator* 
Negative News Indicator 
0.072 0.099 -0.150 0.064 0.104 0.074 
(0.424) (0.313) (0.556) (0.256) (0.336) (0.240) 
Asymmetry 0.040 0.042 -0.058 -0.021 -0.099* 0.011 
 (0.429) (0.425) (0.762) (0.550) (0.088) (0.784)
Asymmetry*Negative News 
Indicator 
-0.082 -0.066 -0.189 -0.005 0.074 -0.048 
(0.247) (0.382) (0.405) (0.913) (0.421) (0.406) 
Distress Indicator 0.080 0.064 0.254 -0.103*** -0.102 -0.113** 
 (0.262) (0.390) (0.233) (0.010) (0.174) (0.014) 
Distress Indicator*Negative News 
Indicator 
-0.207* -0.233* -0.282 0.031 -0.032 0.096 
(0.062) (0.055) (0.314) (0.602) (0.760) (0.169)
Institutional Ownership 0.129 0.150 0.162 -0.068 -0.122 -0.074 
 (0.396) (0.336) (0.772) (0.360) (0.358) (0.384) 
Institutional Ownership*Negative 
News Indicator 
-0.411* -0.334 -0.813 -0.005 -0.019 0.038 
(0.067) (0.163) (0.238) (0.966) (0.928) (0.763) 
       





Panel D: After Trading Hours on the Last Trading Day of the Week 
 
 Old 8-K (1996-2004) New 8-K (2004-2011)
 Overall Voluntary 
News 
Mandatory News Overall Voluntary 
News 
Mandatory News 
Constant -2.503*** -2.682*** -2.688*** -2.181*** -2.658*** -1.945*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Items 0.162 0.290 -0.002 0.059*** 0.163*** 0.003 
 (0.606) (0.469) (0.994) (0.008) (0.000) (0.886) 
Negative News Indicator 0.054 -0.016 0.793** 0.130** 0.348*** 0.032 
 (0.641) (0.901) (0.031) (0.012) (0.004) (0.499) 
High Litigation Indicator 0.165 0.047 1.728*** 0.130** 0.139 0.105* 
 (0.263) (0.762) (0.001) (0.016) (0.134) (0.085) 
High Litigation Indicator* 
Negative News Indicator 
-0.064 0.042 -1.549*** -0.027 -0.116 0.053 
(0.768) (0.857) (0.009) (0.724) (0.475) (0.496) 
Asymmetry -0.103 -0.096 -0.516 -0.015 -0.184** 0.034 
 (0.423) (0.475) (0.227) (0.760) (0.028) (0.530)
Asymmetry*Negative News 
Indicator 
-0.062 -0.120 0.425 0.041 0.195 -0.025 
(0.733) (0.540) (0.394) (0.536) (0.148) (0.728) 
Distress Indicator 0.182 0.112 0.965* -0.082 -0.045 -0.095 
 (0.346) (0.591) (0.057) (0.145) (0.654) (0.123) 
Distress Indicator*Negative News 
Indicator 
-0.213 0.026 -1.459** -0.015 -0.182 0.087 
(0.449) (0.934) (0.024) (0.839) (0.191) (0.319)
Institutional Ownership -0.055 0.109 -1.346 0.085 0.241 -0.016 
 (0.881) (0.773) (0.390) (0.425) (0.187) (0.890) 
Institutional Ownership*Negative 
News Indicator 
0.232 0.025 1.900 -0.247* -0.408 -0.148 
(0.655) (0.964) (0.265) (0.096) (0.178) (0.348) 
       
Observations 10,051 8,721 1,381 85,775 30,748 59,154 
 
Table 3 shows the regression results of the disclosure strategy variables on firm characteristics and type of news. P values are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable in 
Panel A, B, C, and D is the reporting lag between the filing and event days, after trading hours indicator, last trading day of the week indicator, and after trading hours on the last day 
of the week indicator, respectively. High Litigation Indicator takes the value of 1 for firms in SIC codes with high litigation likelihood. Asymmetry is the resulting factor from factor 
analysis utilizing the market-to-book ratio, equity return volatility, leverage, membership in high-tech industry, and regulatory status. Distress Indicator takes the value of 1 if the 
beginning of the year Zmijewski (1984) Z-score is in the top decile. Institutional Ownership is the proportion of institutional ownership by institutions holding more than 5% of the 
shares outstanding. With the exception of the reporting lag regression, the regressions are computed using Logit. The reporting lag regression is computed using Tobit. All 
regressions include year fixed effect. The standard errors correct for firm clustering. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Reporting Strategy and News Bundling 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Reporting Behavior 
 
  Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Standard Deviation Afterhours 0.377 0.353 0.475 0.502 
Standard Deviation Last Day 0.268 0 0.332 0.439 
Standard Deviation Afterhours on Last Day 0.188 0 0.198 0.361 
 
 
Panel B: Proportion of Voluntary and Mandatory Items by Form Complexity 
 
Number of Items Mandatory News Voluntary News 
2 61.9 38.1 
3 57.15 42.85 
4 51.72 48.28 
5 49.56 50.44 






Panel C: Positive and Negative Voluntary and Mandatory News 
 
Voluntary News 
Mandatory News Positive Negative Total 
Positive 2467 1485 3952 
(62.4%) (37.6%) 
    
Negative 2020 2322 4342 
  (46.5%) (53.5%)   





Panel D: Regressions of Manipulation through Bundling on Proxies for Opportunistic Reporters 
 
 Positive Voluntary & Negative 
Mandatory 
Negative Voluntary & Positive 
Mandatory 
Disagreement Between 
Voluntary and Mandatory 
Constant -2.425*** -2.501*** -2.822*** -2.855*** -1.838*** -1.900*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Company Indicator 0.145***  0.128**  0.151***  
 (0.010)  (0.035)  (0.001)  
Standard Deviation Afterhours 0.245 0.701*** 0.279 0.503* 0.283** 0.673*** 
 (0.119) (0.005) (0.105) (0.051) (0.021) (0.000)
Standard Deviation Last Day 0.069 0.154 0.295* 0.340 0.182 0.257 
 (0.655) (0.463) (0.079) (0.153) (0.127) (0.116) 
Standard Deviation Afterhours on Last Day -0.082 -0.072 -0.038 0.186 -0.070 0.043 
 (0.581) (0.712) (0.809) (0.375) (0.547) (0.777) 
       
Observations 20,338 12,116 20,338 12,116 20,338 12,116 
 
Table 4 shows the results of news bundling analysis. Panel A shows descriptive statistics of the variability in during/after trading hours, last day, and during/after trading 
hours reporting on last day reporting. Specifically, for each 8-K report we create an indicator variable based on whether the report was filed after trading hours, on the last 
day, and after trading hours on the last day. We then compute for each firm year the variability of these indicator variables using all 8-K reports that the firm filed prior to year 
t. Panel B shows the proportion of voluntary and mandatory items by the number of items included in the 8-K. For example, 38% of the 8-K reports with two items include 
voluntary news. Panel C presents the frequency of positive and negative voluntary and mandatory news for all 8-K reports which include both voluntary and mandatory news. 
Panel D provides the regression results. The Positive Voluntary & Negative Mandatory columns show the results where the dependent variable is an indicator with 1 if the 8-
K report includes positive voluntary news together with negative mandatory news; The Negative Voluntary & Positive Mandatory columns show the results where the 
dependent variable is an indicator with 1 if the 8-K report includes negative voluntary news together with positive mandatory news; The Disagreement Between Voluntary 
and Mandatory columns show the results where the dependent variable is an indicator with 1 if the 8-K report includes voluntary news and mandatory news with conflicting 





Table 5: Market Reaction Analysis 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 









on Last Day 
3 65 -1.250** 3.954 0.292 0.123 0.169 
4 1039 -0.480*** 4.951 0.369 0.136 0.092 
6 31 0.030 2.355 0.323 0.161 0.065 
1.02 895 -0.170 3.945 0.455 0.094 0.093 
1.03 16 -8.670*** 3.063 0.375 0.063 0.000 
2.04 288 -1.130*** 4.021 0.517 0.069 0.153 
3.01 2858 -1.750*** 3.821 0.448 0.089 0.190 
4.01 1265 -0.350*** 5.202 0.415 0.123 0.120 
4.02 603 -0.530*** 4.914 0.564 0.065 0.139 
Average 1996-2003   -0.567 3.753 0.328 0.140 0.109 
Average 2005-2011 -2.100 4.161 0.462 0.084 0.116 
 
 
Panel B: Difference in Return 
 
Item Afterhours Last_Day Afterhours on Last Day 
3 -1.029 -3.818 -2.435 
4 0.074 -0.409 -0.553 
6 -3.236* -3.638* -0.880 
1.02 0.431 -0.107 -0.632 
1.03 5.476 -9.984 
2.04 -1.075* 1.412* 0.192 
3.01 -0.407* -0.029 0.164 
4.01 -0.157 0.290 0.102 
4.02 0.853** 1.449* 0.370 
Average 1996-2003 -0.057 -0.682 -0.507 






Panel C: Regression of Return on Proxies for Disclosure Strategy 
 








 CAR  
Constant 0.007 -0.014 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.547) (0.527) (0.218) (0.295) 
Afterhours Indicator -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.294) (0.569) (0.720) (0.671) 
Reporting Lag 0.000 0.000* -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.746) (0.072) (0.274) (0.046) 
Last Trading Day Indicator -0.010** -0.022*** 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.030) (0.003) (0.585) (0.750) 
Afterhours on Last Trading Day 
Indicator 
-0.010* -0.020** 0.001 0.003 
(0.056) (0.020) (0.769) (0.407) 
Form News 0.220 0.118 -0.028 0.126 
 (0.114) (0.643) (0.597) (0.150) 
     
Observations 1,135 1,135 5,925 5,925 
R-squared 0.023 0.022 0.020 0.017 
 
Table 5 presents the analysis of the relation between disclosure strategy and equity returns. Panel A provides 
descriptive statistic related to selected 8-K items which provide negative news. Abnormal Return is the 
abnormal returns on the filing date if the form was filed during trading hours or the abnormal returns on the 
following trading day if the form was filed after trading hours. Proportion Afterhours, Proportion Last Day, 
and Proportion Afterhours on Last Day is the proportion of 8-K reports containing the specific item reported 
after trading hours, on the last trading day of the week, and after trading hours on the last trading day of the 
week, respectively. Panel B shows univariate statistics on the return for the proxies for disclosure strategy. 
The Afterhours column shows the difference in market reaction between the return on forms that were filed 
outside trading hours and all other forms; the Last Day columns shows the difference between the abnormal 
returns on forms that were filed on the last trading day of the week and all other forms; the Afterhours on 
Last Day columns presents the difference in abnormal returns on forms that were filed outside trading hours 
on last trading day of the week and all other forms. Panel C provides the regression results. 3-Day CAR is 
the three-day cumulative abnormal returns centered on the filing date. Form News is the news score obtained 
using textual analysis tool General Inquirer (GI). Specifically, for each form we compute the difference 
between the number of positive and negative financial words and scale the difference by the total number of 
words in the form. The regressions are estimated using OLS. All regressions include year and Item fixed 
effects. The standard errors correct for firm clustering. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 




Table 6: Market Reaction To Opportunistic Reporting Through News Bundling  
 
 Positive Voluntary & 
Negative Mandatory 









 CAR  
Constant -0.012** -0.023 -0.004 -0.013 
 (0.021) (0.126) (0.789) (0.548) 
News Bundling Indicator -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.792) (0.620) (0.400) (0.649) 
Afterhours Indicator 0.007 0.096 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.843) (0.208) (0.914) (0.960) 
Reporting Lag -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.512) (0.414) (0.537) (0.786) 
Last Trading Day Indicator -0.003 0.035** -0.082 -0.141 
 (0.888) (0.021) (0.388) (0.306) 
Afterhours on Last Trading Day 
Indicator 
0.019*** 0.117 0.034 -0.010 
(0.000) (0.317) (0.490) (0.894) 
Mandatory News -0.092 0.585   
 (0.830) (0.537)   
Voluntary News   -0.046 -0.429 
   (0.930) (0.586) 
     
Observations 1,666 1,666 1,516 1,516 
R-squared 0.481 0.505 0.482 0.502 
Table 6 presents the results of the analysis of the relation between disclosure strategy using news bundling 
and equity returns. The dependent variable the abnormal return on the filing date or on the following day if 
the 8-K is filed after trading hours, and the 3 day cumulative abnormal return centered on the filing date. The 
regressions are estimated using matched sample. The Positive Voluntary & Negative Mandatory columns 
show the regression for the sample of 8-K reports consisting of positive voluntary news together with 
negative mandatory news matched with sample of 8-K reports consisting of negative mandatory news only. 
The News Bundling Indicator takes the value of 1 if the firm reports positive voluntary news and negative 
mandatory news, and zero otherwise.  The Negative Voluntary & Positive Mandatory columns show the 
regression for the sample of 8-K reports consisting of negative voluntary news together with positive 
mandatory news matched with sample of 8-K reports consisting of negative voluntary news only. The News 
Bundling Indicator takes the value of 1 if the firm reports negative voluntary news and positive mandatory 
news, and zero otherwise.  The regressions include matched pair dummies, and are estimated using OLS. 
The standard errors correct for firm clustering. ***, **, and * denote two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
